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Economic Discrimination • Denial of Social Securitv Benefits Premised on
Gender-Based Classification Is Unconstitutional - Violates Equal Protection
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975)
TER HER MARRIAGE to Stephen Wiesenfeld, Paula Polatschek, who was
. employed as a teacher for five years prior to her marriage, continued
teaching and from her earnings the maximum social security contributions
were deducted. Her income was substantially larger than that of her husband
and served as the couple's principal source of support. In 1972, Paula
died in childbirth.
After his wife's death, Wiesenfeld applied for social security survivor
benefits for himself and his infant son. While he was able to obtain benefits
for his son under 42 U.S.C. Section 402(d), 1 he was denied benefits under
Section 402(g) because those benefits were available only to widows and
surviving divorced mothers.2 When his application was denied, Wiesenfeld
brought suit in federal district court to obtain declaratory and injunctive
relief,' contending that the gender-based classification of 42 U.S.C. Section
402(g) violated equal protection as found within the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.' A three-judge district court panel granted relief finding
that the different treatment mandated by 42 U.S.C. Section 402(g) unjusti-
fiably discriminated against women wage-earners by affording their survivors
less protection than is provided the survivors of male wage-earners.5
The district court rendered its decision after struggling to determine
which constitutional standard of review should be applied when confronted
with a statute which denies benefits on the basis of sex. Applying the
traditional equal protection analysis 6 the court determined that the classifica-
1 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970), is entitled "Child's insurance benefits" and provides benefits
for "Every child ... of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual.. ..."
- 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970), is entitled "Mother's insurance benefits" and provides bene-
fits for the widow and every surviving divorced mother who has a child in her care who
is entitled to child's insurance benefits and is the child of an individual who died a fully
or currently insured individual.
Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and Welf., 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973).
The action was originally brought as a class action which was not permitted by the court
since Wiesenfeld's conceded purpose in bringing a class action was to safeguard against
mootness.
4 The fifth amendment provides that no person "shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." Although it does not contain an equal protection
clause, the Supreme Court has applied to the federal government the same requirements
imposed on the states under the fourteenth amendment. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95
S. Ct. 572 (1975); Schneider v. Rush, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
5 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973).
6 Under the traditional equal protection test a statutory classification will be upheld if
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tion bore a rational relationship to a legitimate statutory purpose of correcting
unequal job opportunities available to women and the need to protect women
and their families who have lost the male head of the household.7 Nevertheless,
the court determined that the traditional equal protection test was inadequate
and applied the higher standard of review of "close judicial scrutiny."'
Although the court was reluctant to find classifications based on sex as
conclusively "inherently suspect,"' it chose the higher standard despite the
fact that Congress may have intended to rectify the past and present
discrimination against women.
On direct appeal,' ° the Supreme Court affirmed." Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom six justices' 2 concurred, delivered the majority opinion. The Court
determined that the classification as found within 42 U.S.C. Section 402(g)
was premised upon an overbroad generalization as to dependency, namely,
that male worker's earnings are vital to their families' support whereas the
earnings of female wage-earners do not significantly contribute to their
family's support. Justice Brennan reasoned that the legislative history of the
statute clearly substantiated that the congressional purpose was not to provide
benefits to widows due to economic discrimination, but to provide benefits to
minor children by allowing women to elect not to work and to devote
the Court can attribute to the legislation any reasonable conceivable purpose which
would support the constitutionality of the classification. See, e.g., Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 316 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949). See generally Gunther,
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1077-87 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
7 367 F. Supp. 981, 989-90 (D.N.J. 1973).
s If the Court finds that a statute affects a "fundamental interest" or employs a "suspect
classification" the legislative purpose of the statute is subject to "strict scrutiny" to
determine if the legislative purpose is so compelling as to justify the classification. See,
e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). When the traditional equal protection
test is used the statute will generally be upheld, however, the use of "strict scrutiny" is
generally a signal that the law will be found unconstitutional, see Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as The Supreme Court, 1971 Term].
9 "While a decision by a divided Court is as final on all issues of a case as a decision by
a unanimous Court the reasoning employed by a plurality does not become the law.
Frontiero demonstrates that a majority of the Supreme Court has not yet classified sex
as 'inherently suspect.' " 367 F. Supp. at 988. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677(1973), the plurality opinion found classifications based on sex "inherently suspect" and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. See text accompanying note 17 infra.
10 28 U.S.C. § 1235 (1970), provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any
order granting a permanent injunction heard before a three-judge court.11 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
12 Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Burger, C.J., Stewart, White, Marshall,
Blackmun and Powell. Justice Powell also filed a concurring opinion in which Chief
Justice Burger joined. Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in result. Justice
Douglas did not take part in the decision of the case.
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themselves to the care of their children.'3 In his opinion, Justice Brennan
relied primarily on Frontiero v. Richardson," which involved the right of
a lieutenant in the United States Air Force to claim her spouse as a
"dependent" for the purpose of obtaining dependents' benefits. Under the
statutes providing for such benefits the spouse of a male member was entitled
to such benefits without question, whereas the spouse of a female member was
required to prove he was dependent on her for over one-half of his support.
5
In Frontiero, the Supreme Court reversed a three-judge court which
upheld the gender-based classification under the traditional equal protection
test of minimum rationality." Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, found
that classifications based on sex, like those based on race, alienage and
national origin, are inherently suspect and should be subjected to "strict
judicial scrutiny." 7 Applying this standard, he found no compelling govern-
mental interest that could justify the classification. Justice Powell, with whom
two justices"8 joined, concurred in the judgment but declined to determine
whether a classification based on sex could be a suspect classification. In his
view the statute failed the minimum rationality test formulated by the Court
in Reed v. Reed 9 and for this reason was unconstitutional.
°
13 Mr. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion found it immaterial whether the
surviving parent elects to assume primary child care since benefits are available to
the mother who stays at home or who works for low wages. 95 S. Ct. at 1236. Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, concurring in the result, reasoned that the statutory distinction between men
and women did not serve any valid legislative purpose. He did not believe it necessary to
reach a decision as to whether the statute discriminated against female workers in
violation of the fifth amendment.
14 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
15 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
16 Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 207-09 (N.D. Ala. 1972), rev'd sub. nom.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
1 411 U.S. at 682-88. A number of state courts have recognized the need for close
judicial scrutiny in the sex classification area. E.g., Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243
A.2d 400 (1968).
18 Justice Powell was joined by Justices Burger, C.J., and Blackmun. Justice Stewart
concurred on the basis of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Justice Rehnquist dissented,
agreeing with the lower court's analysis.
" 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the Court considered a fourteenth amendment equal
protection challenge of an Idaho statute that gave preference to men over women when
persons of equal entitlement sought appointment for administrator of a decedent's estate.
The Idaho supreme court reasoned that the legislature established the automatic
preference for males to relieve probate courts of the burden of hearings on qualifications
of such applicants and further concluded that men generally are likely to have more
business experience and would be better qualified. The classification was found not to be
arbitrary or unreasonable. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970).
The United States Supreme Court reversed finding that a mandatory preference for
males did not bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest. 404 U.S. at 76.
20 411 U.S. at 692. Justice Powell also observed that the Court had undertaken a
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In applying the Frontiero holding, Justice Brennan avoided a declaration
of the proper standard of review to be used in testing the validity of a
gender-based classification. The Court's opinion simply states that the
assumption that spouses of servicewomen would not normally be dependent
upon their wives is identical to the overbroad generalization that the income
of women wage-earners does not contribute significantly to their families'
support.2 ' The Court determined that, although the notion that men are more
likely than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children
is not entirely without empirical support," such a generalization could not
deprive a woman of a portion of her earnings and deny her family the same
protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received.2"
The Government sought to uphold the statute by arguing that Congress
is not obliged to provide the same benefits to a female employee as to a male
employee since social security insurance is non-contractual in nature and not
an accrued property right within the meaning of the fifth amendment." This
contention was based on Flemming v. Nestor,"5 in which the Court had held
that social security benefits are non-contractual.
However, the Flemming case had not entirely abrogated a covered
employee's right to benefits. The Court had determined that although the
federal statute could constitutionally withhold non-contractual benefits upon
the deportation of the employee, the interest of a covered employee is of
sufficient substance to fall within due process protection. 6 Therefore, the
Court in Weinberger concluded that since benefits significantly depend upon
participation in the work force, and covered employees are required to pay
taxes, the benefits must be distributed according to classifications which do
decisional responsibility which had been directed to the states for their consideration by
virtue of the Equal Rights Amendment.
"1 95 S. Ct. at 1231. The Court also noted that Wiesenfeld was not given an opportunity
to show whether he was dependent upon his wife as was permitted under the statutes
invalidated in Frontiero. See note 15 supra.
22 See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 354 (1974), where the Court relied heavily on
statistical data supporting the view that widows may often find themselves thrust into thejob market with which they are unfamiliar, and in which, due to former dependency
upon their husbands, widows have fewer skills to offer. See also Murphy, Females' Wage
Discrimination: A Study of the Equal Pay Act 1963-1970, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 615,.
616-18 (1970).
2 95 S. Ct. at 1232.
24 Id.
2 5 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
2 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
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not "without sufficient justification differentiate among covered employees
solely on the basis of sex." 27
The Government also attempted to justify the classification as one
reasonably designed to compensate women beneficiaries as a group for the
economic difficulties which confront women who seek to support themselves
and their families. This justification was based primarily on the Supreme
Court's holding in Kahn v. Shevin. - In Kahn, a state statute granting widows
an annual property tax exemption was upheld as being reasonably designed to
further a state policy of cushioning the financially disproportionate impact
of spousal loss upon women.2 9 The Weinberger Court rejected this assertion
that the social security statute was designed to compensate women for their
economic difficulties. It reasoned that since Section 402(g) benefits are
contingent upon responsibility to minor children, 3 and since legislative history
reveals a congressional purpose 1 to aid young widows with children, the
statute was intended to permit women to elect not to work and to devote
themselves to the full-time care of their children. Since the statute could not
be supported by a legislative purpose to provide for the special problems of
women, as in Kahn, the classification was indistinguishable from the
classification held invalid in Frontiero.
The majority opinion of Weinberger successfully avoids a declaration of
the proper standard to be used when dealing with gender-based classifications.
Justice Brennan, who authored this opinion and the plurality opinion declaring
gender-based classifications subject to close judicial scrutiny in Frontiero, and
who adhered to his analysis in opinions subsequent to Frontiero,"2 chose not to
follow that analysis in Weinberger. Thus, Brennan appears to be joining four
other Justices who have avoided the use of the strict scrutiny test in the
sex-based classification area.33
2 795 S. Ct. at 1233. '18416 U.S. 351 (1974).
29 In Kahn, six members of the Court joined to uphold the Florida statute granting
widows an annual $500 property tax exemption. Upon challenge by a widower, the
Court, after reviewing data compiled by the Women's Bureau of the United States
Department of Labor, concluded that a state tax law is not arbitrary, although it
discriminates in favor of a certain class, if such discrimination is founded upon a
reasonable distinction or state policy. 416 U.S. at 355.
30 See note 2 supra.
31 95 S. Ct. at 1233-34. Both the Advisory Council on Social Security in 1938 and 1971
referred to the benefits of § 402(g) as enabling the mother of young children to choose
to stay home and care for the children instead of working. The 1971 Advisory Council
saw no reason to extend the benefits to fathers reasoning that few men would choose to
stay home. See Sex Classifications in the Social Security Benefit Structure, 49 IND. L.J.
181, 188 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sex Classifications].
22 See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. Ct. 572, 579 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Geduldig v. Aiello, 411
U.S. 484, 497 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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The Weinberger decision and the more recent case of Stanton v.
Stanton3" confirm that the majority of the Supreme Court is not yet willing to
decide whether a classification based on sex is inherently suspect and therefore
subject to close judicial scrutiny. In Stanton, eight justices" joined to declare
unconstitutional a Utah statute which established the ages of majority for
females at 18 years and for males at 21 years at least for the minimum
purpose of determining the duration of a divorced husband's child support
obligation. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Stanton, found Reed
controlling and specifically stated that it was unnecessary to determine whether
sex is a suspect classification.3" The Court determined that the traditional
views of the necessity of education for males as future breadwinners, whereas
females generally marry earlier and do not require such education, could not
sustain a statute establishing different ages of majority. While discussing the
broad effects of the statute in other areas of the law,17 the Court carefully
limited its holding to the context of child support framed within a potpourri
of tests: "We therefore conclude that under any test-compelling state
interest, or rational basis, or something in between--Section 15-2-1 in the
context of child support, does not survive an equal protection attack.""
An analysis of Weinberger, Reed, Frontiero and Stanton, indicates that
the majority of the Court will not apply in the near future strict scrutiny in the
sex classification area. In lieu of such criteria the Court has utilized the old
equal protection test under a broader scope." ' The Justices who found Reed
to be controlling in the Frontiero decision necessarily utilized a more stringent
test than that of the traditional minimum rationality test. In Reed, the manda-
tory preference for males when persons of equal entitlement sought assignment
as administrator of an estate was weighed against a state objective of reducing
the work of probate courts by eliminating a qualifications hearing. The Reed
Court concluded that the mandatory preference was not justified merely for
the elimination of a hearing. 0 The Idaho court had thought that the classifica-
tion could be sustained on the basis that, as a general rule, men have more
experience in business matters relevant to the administration of an estate.41
34 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975).
31 Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.
36 95 S. Ct. at 1377.
3; Id. at 1379. The Court noted several areas of law wherein the age of majority is
significant: minor's ability to disaffirm a contract, tolling of the statute of limitations with
a minor, necessity of the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor, and the
inability of a minor to serve as an administrator of decedent's estate.
38 Id.
39 See generally Gunther, Developments in the Law, supra note 6; Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, supra note 8.
40 404 U.S. at 76.
41 Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970).
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The United States Supreme Court was unwilling to consider this
theoretical basis for the distinction, however reasonable it may appear, to
sustain a statute discriminating on the basis of sex. Justice Marshall explains
this analysis as something more than the traditional minimum rationality test.4"
He reasons that the Reed decision can only be understood as an instance where
the invidious character of the classification caused the Court to pause and
scrutinize with more than the traditional care, with the resulting test lying
somewhere in between strict scrutiny and minimum rationality. He finds that
this "in between" test, or sliding scale, is used in the areas where the Court is
faced with discrimination which it implicitly recognizes to have deep social and
legal roots without necessarily having any basis in actual differences."
The Frontiero decision more clearly supports Justice Marshall's analysis.4"
The assumption in Frontiero that the wives of servicemen are more often
dependent upon their spouses than husbands of servicewomen plausibly bears
sufficient relation to reality to meet the minimum rationality test, yet the Court
struck the statute down. Although a plurality of the justices utilized the strict
scrutiny test, the remaining justices, relying on Reed, used the sliding scale
against which administrative convenience was not enough to sustain the
statute. In Stanton, the Court, citing Reed as controlling, struck down a statute
which was based on the traditional view of a woman's role and the traditional
belief that education for a male is essential but not for a female. Stereotypes,
however reasonable under traditional views, generally will fall under this
sliding scale approach.4"
Even if the Court has abandoned the strict scrutiny test as formulated in
the plurality opinion of Frontiero, this new "in between" test is sufficiently
potent to overturn discriminatory legislation, as is apparent from the foregoing
decisions. However, in light of the Kahn decision and its reaffirmation in
Weinberger, it is also apparent that the Court will continue to recognize the
constitutionality of certain governmental actions that differentiate between
the sexes. 6 It appears that legislative action will serve to satisfy a legitimate
interest and even the strict scrutiny test if the statute can be justified as neces-
sary to cushion the financial impact of past economic discrimination of women.
42 See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 106 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), in which Justice Marshall delivered a forceful dissent tracing the Court's
recent developments in the equal protection area. He criticized the Court's rigid approach
in Rodriguez where the majority failed to recognize public education as a fundamental
right.
4 3 ld. at 107.
44 Justice Marshall joined in the plurality opinion finding sex as a suspect classification.
45 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975).
46 See generally Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality,
1972 Sup. C. REv. 157 (1973).
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If Section 402(g) was not related to child care as found by the Court in
Weinberger, the statute clearly would have been upheld on the Kahn rationale.
The significance of these decisions will have immediate effect in the
social security area by virtue of its gender-based benefit structure. Following
the consistency of the former decisions, the gender-based benefit structure will
be subject to attack with the aid of this new more stringent minimum
rationality test. However, if the statute can be reasonably pigeonholed
within the rationale of compensating women for past discrimination, the
statute will most likely be upheld.
In Polelle v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,4' a male
plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged provisions of the Social Security Act which
permitted use of three fewer years as a basis for calculating a female wage
earner's average monthly wage, thus increasing the monthly retirement benefits
for females over males."8 A three-judge district court upheld the provisions
reasoning that the provisions were reasonably designed to compensate women
for past discrimination in the economic job market. The difference of treatment
is to be phased out this year, 1975. As noted by the court in Polelle, perhaps
Congress has determined that by this time women will have worked a sufficient
number of years under the Equal Pay Act49 and similar acts, that further
compensation for economic discrimination is unnecessary.5" Such an inference
could have a far reaching effect when dealing with the social security benefit
structure. No longer will the courts be able to rely on the Kahn decision and its
rationale to sustain benefits for women while denying like benefits for men."
One particular area within the social security structure has already fallen
as a result of recent Supreme Court decisions. Until Weinberger, husbands and
widowers could not qualify for benefits unless they were able to show they
received over one-half of their individual support from their wives." This
presumption that husbands are not dependent upon their wives is identical to
the statutes in Frontiero and Weinberger. If the Court consistently follows the
Reed, Frontiero and Weinberger decisions with their sliding scale analysis, it
47 386 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. 111. 1974).
48 42 U.S.C. § 215(b) (3) (1970).
'9 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
50 386 F. Supp. at 445. See also Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied sub nom. Gruenwald v. Cohen, 393 U.S. 982 (1968); Rosen v. Public
Service Electric and Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454 (D.N.J. 1971). In Rosen a private
retirement plan favoring females was found to violate provisions within the Civil Rights
Act against sex discrimination in compensation or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
51 See Sex Classifications, supra note 31, at 186.
12 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C), (f)(I)(D) (i) (1970).
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reasonably must find these provisions unconstitutional. A three-judge district
court has so held in Goldfarb v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare." ,
In Goldfarb, a 70-year-old widower sought survivor's benefits after the
death of his wife. Although his employment had not been covered by social
security, his wife had paid taxes for some 25 years. The district court
determined that, since Mrs. Goldfarb had been taxed at the same rate as
men, she was entitled to the dignity of knowing that her social security tax
would contribute to their joint welfare, or her husband's welfare should she
predecease him, regardless of the ratio of their respective contributions to the
family expenses.' If the Supreme Court grants certiorari in the Goldfarb case,
it will again be faced head-on with a gender-based classification precluding
benefits for men. Although the statutory scheme is strikingly similar to the
Frontiero statutes, the Court will again be forced to consider whether the
rationale of past economic discrimination, as in Kahn, can sustain the statute.
Despite the efforts of the Court to avoid a declaration finding gender-
based classification subject to strict scrutiny, the recent decisions have achieved
nearly the same effect. Although Justice Marshall criticizes the vagueness of
the sliding scale analysis, 5 whether gender-based distinctions are found to be
suspect classifications is of little relevance if the Court intends to utilize a test
nearly equivalent to strict scrutiny. Certainly in the social security area, these
recent decisions will cause men and women to pause and consider court
actions before accepting corresponding benefits based solely on their sex.
JANICE M. AHERN
53 Case No. 74 C 1188 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1975). Notice of Appeal to the United States
Supreme Court was filed July 15, 1975. See also Silbowitz v. Secretary of Health, Educ.
and Welf., 44 U.S.L.W. 2030 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 1975); Jablon v. Secretary of Health,
Educ. and Welf., 44 U.S.L.W. 1027 (D. Md. July 28, 1975).
54 Id. at 3.
j. stice Marshall viewed decisions such as Reed with the sliding scale analysis as efforts
y the Court to shield rather than to reveal the true basis of the Court's decision. See San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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